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ANDRÁS NIKODÉM * 
 
The European Public Prosecutor: Waiting for Godot?1 
 
 
Abstract. This article offers an excursion into the world of fraud-fight in the European 
context. The first part introduces a hypothetical case on the modus operandi of 
perpetrators of trans-national fraud cases. On the basis of this case, shortcomings of the 
current legal mechanisms protecting the financial interests of the European Community 
will be analyzed. Then the article deals with the establishment of the office of the European 
Public Prosecutor (EPP) as a proposed legislative response to the challenges posed by EC 
fraud. 
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Introduction 
 
EC fraud does not only lead to heated debates in expert circles but also excites 
media attention. It is, and it must be, of great public concern. Less welcomed 
is the interest of organized criminal networks in benefiting from the short-
comings of the current legal mechanisms intended to protect the Community 
institutions and the Community citizens from fraud. These perpetrators do not 
wait to exploit the possibilities in the internal market until the burdensome 
European decision-making machinery finds the solution to the challenges 
posed by trans-national EC fraud cases. While the frontier-free Europe became 
a reality, the problems due to the fragmentation of the criminal law enforce-
ment area in the EU remained. Seven magistrates launched therefore the 


 
*
 LL.M, Research Assistant, Central European University Legal Studies Department, 
H–1051 Budapest, Nádor u. 9. 
E-mail: lphnia01@phd.ceu.hu  
 
1
 In preparation of this article I would like to thank my colleagues at the European 
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) for their help and support. All errors remain the respon-
sibility of the author. 
 This essay forms part of a monograph on EC Fraud expected to see the light of day in 
2004. An already published part of this monograph can be found in Managerial Law, Vol. 44. 
No. 4. 2002, 59–76., under the title “The Evolution of Anti-Fraud Policy in the European 
Community from a Constitutional Law Perspective”.  
230 ANDRÁS NIKODÉM 
  
Geneva Appeal in 1996 drawing attention to the legal deficiencies burdening the 
fight against international financial crime.2 One year later was the Commission 
initiated Corpus Juris study published opening up a public debate on the role 
and forms of criminal law protection in the European Judicial Space.3 In light 
of the Corpus Juris study further assessments of national legislation on the 
protection of the financial interests of the European Community both in the 
Member States4 and in the candidate countries5 appeared. While most of these 
proposed rules belong yet to the category of lex desiderata, the message is 
clear: reshaping the fragmented criminal law-enforcement area of the EC.  
 In this process gained the idea of the establishment of the office for a 
European Prosecutor its significance. The enforcement of the measures 
proposed by the Corpus Juris study would be the duty of a common European 
Prosecutor acting on the single European judicial territory.6 In practical terms 
this would enable the European Public Prosecutor to carry out investigations 
within the European Community and prosecute perpetrators before national 
courts of law. The media response was not fully welcoming to the EPP.7 Nor 
was the Nice IGC that did not finally adopt the proposal of the Commission to 
establish the office of the EPP. Hence the latter published its Green Paper to 
encourage further reflection and debate on the idea of a European Public 
Prosecutor.8 Meanwhile, following the Presidency Conclusions adopted after 
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the summit in Tampere9 pro-Eurojust was set up10 to coordinate prosecutions. 
Furthermore, the Commission introduced an ambitious proposal for a directive 
on the criminal law protection of the Community’s financial interests.11 
 The emerged proposals would lead to harmonized criminal substantive and 
procedural rules and to the institution of a European prosecutor responsible for 
the enforcement of these rules. The idea is not an absolute innovation but 
harmonization of criminal law was always a very sensitive political topic in the 
course of European integration.12 There is an evident tension between the interests 
of Member States to preserve traditional prerogatives of state sovereignty13 and 
those of the Community to acquire the necessary means to tackle fraud on the 
European level.  
 In light of the above said, and in particular concerning the reforms of 
criminal codes in the candidate countries,14 it is useful to overview before the 
next intergovernmental conference following the European Convention what 
specific changes EC fraud necessitates in the acquis. To this aim, a hypothetical 
case puts into a very practical perspective the modus operandi of perpetrators 
of trans-national EC fraud in the first part of this article. On the basis of this 
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quoted by Spencer, J. R.: “The Corpus Juris Project-Has it a Future?” Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies. 355. 
 
14
 It is worth noticing that in Hungary, for example, the criminal code had been amended 
since 1990 almost forty times! See Farkas, Á. and Petró, R.: Problematic Issues of Hungarian 
Criminal Law related to the Protection of the Financial Interests of the European 
Communities. Agon. No. 31. 2001. 2–4. 
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imaginary case will the second part tackle selected major problems in the fight 
against EC fraud. The last part of the article deals with a key institution in the 
recent proposals to counteract the perpetrators of trans-national fraud, the 
European Public Prosecutor.  
 
 
Part I.  
 
The phenomenon of EC Fraud: The case of defected wheel bicycle industry 
corporation 
 
The European Commission publishes every year its annual report on the Fight 
against fraud including an analysis of data on fraud cases and of recent trends. 
As a consequence of Article 280 (5) of the Amsterdam Treaty, which came 
into force on 1 May 1999, the annual report on 2000 contained for the first time 
a report on the Member Sates activities with a view to protecting the 
Community’s financial interests. Moreover, various Community legislative inst-
ruments oblige the Member States to report periodically on their investigative 
activities in certain sectors of Community policies. These reports represent a 
regular source of information for researchers on EC fraud.  
 To provide a detailed typology of reported fraud cases goes far beyond the 
limits of this article. What I have tried below is to give account for one type of 
fraud schemes, more precisely, of revenue fraud cases. My aim was to shed 
light on the modus operandi of perpetrators in a case where everything is the 
product of my imagination.15  
 
The case 
 
Defected Wheel Bicycle Industry Corporation is a Chinese enterprise specialized 
in bicycles. One of its target areas is the European market. From 1990 onwards 
this enterprise, together with other Chinese firms, sold loads of bicycles in 
Europe at a relatively cheap price. The reaction of the European Community 
was to protect its market by adopting Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2474/93 
of 8 September 1993. The regulation imposes a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People’s 
Republic of China.16 The consequence of the regulation is that Chinese traders 
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 Hypothetical fraud cases prepared by the Commission can be found in the Green 
Paper. See Annexes 1–3. 
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must pay an additional duty to customs if they want their products penetrate 
into the European internal market. Article 1 (2) of the regulation fixes the rate 
of the anti-dumping duty at 30,6%.  
 Mr. A. M. C. van Dyck, a Dutch trader, who incorporated the Defected 
Wheel Bicycle Industry Corporation in China in order to spread cheap bikes in 
the Dutch market, became furious as the regulation entered into force. He sat 
together with his partners from Germany, the United Kingdom, Portugal and 
Belgium to discuss how to avoid the payment of the anti-dumping duty and to 
maximize profit. They decided that they ship their bikes first to Thailand where 
they set up a new entity, the Flying Golden Wheels Bicycle Manufacturing and 
Trading Corporation. According to their plan, this latter enterprise should 
transport the bikes to the EC under its own name. The reason behind this plan 
was the lack of anti-dumping measure against Thai bikes in the Community at 
that time. In summary, the traders wanted to disguise the Chinese origin of the 
bikes because of the anti-dumping duty imposed on Chinese bicycles by 
Regulation No. 2474/93. Under the name of the Thai company the bikes will be 
sent in five different consignments to five different European ports (Rotterdam, 
Porto, Hamburg, Ostende, Hull) in order to make it more difficult for the 
various customs authorities to connect the crimes and to trace back the true 
origin of the bicycles. In all ports representatives of five different companies 
of the partners of Mr van Dyck would wait the merchandise. These five 
companies are incorporated in five different Member States. The perpetrators 
were aware of the obstacles to controlling transnational EC fraud in the 90-ies, 
notably of the problems flowing from divergent procedural rules and substantive 
norms in each Member State, the division of responsibility for enforcement, 
insufficient cooperation among Member State and Community authorities and 
the weaknesses of collecting and providing information among national and 
Community authorities.17  
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 There is an extensive literature on these problems. On behalf of the European 
institutions the Court of Auditors criticized in a number of its reports throughout the 90-ies 
the Commission for inadequate control. A comprehensive critical assessment of the 
workings of UCLAF can be found in Special report No 8/98 on the Commission's services 
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lutte anti-fraude” (UCLAF) together with the Commission's replies. O.J. 1998 C230 of 22 
July 1988. The reports of the European Parliament, particularly of its Budgetary Control 
Committee, represent also very critical views on the functioning of the mechanisms against 
EC fraud. An example is the Bosch Report of the Committee on Budgetary Control of the 
European Parliament of 22 September 1998, A4-0297/98. Outstanding analysis from 
academic circles can be found in Vervaele, J. A. E.: Fraud against the Community: the 
Need for European Fraud Legislation. Deventer, 1992., Delmas-Marty, M.: Pour un droit 
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 To understand better the complex procedures that the authorities carry out 
only the route of one consignment will be traced. The first consignment arrives 
in Rotterdam. The merchandise, from the time of their entry into the customs 
territory of the Community, is subject to customs supervision. The procedure is 
governed by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 
establishing the Community Customs Code,18 and in addition, by its imple-
menting Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 of 2 September 1993.19 First, goods 
must be presented to customs either by the person who brought them into the 
customs territory of the Community or by the person who assumes responsibility 
for carriage of the goods following such entry. In our case, the manager of 
Two Wheels Inc., a Dutch company, takes further care of the bicycles.  
 The Community Customs Code determines what steps the trader have to take 
before the bicycles obtain the “customs status of Community goods”.20 The 
amount for the customs duties depends on the value of goods for customs 
purposes as set out in Chapter 3 of the Community Customs Code, the tariff 
position of the goods and in certain cases the origin of the goods. The following 
rates would apply for example to bicycles, with product code CN871200, 
originating from China: applicable rate 15% according to Regulation No. 
2261/98 of 26 October 1998,21 tariff preference 10,5% pursuant to Regulation 
                               
commun. Seuil, Paris. 1994., Simone White: Protection of the Financial Interests of the 
European Communities: The Fight against Fraud and Corruption. European Monographs. 
1998., Sieber, U.: Euro-fraud: Organised Fraud against the Financial Interests of the 
European Union. Crime, Law and Social Change 30. 1998. 1–42. 
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 Official Journal, L. 302/1 of 1 October 1992. 
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 Official Journal, L. 253/1 of 11 October 1993. 
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 Customs status of Community goods results in the same status as if the goods were 
provided in a Member State of the Community, that is to say, they can circulate freely within 
the internal market. Not all the goods arriving into the customs territory of the Community 
receive this status and then circulate freely in the single market. After some goods no 
customs are paid. Some of these cases fall under the transit procedure, others under the 
inward processing procedure again others under customs warehousing. Collectively, these 
procedures are called suspensive arrangements. The name indicates that the payment of 
customs is suspended as a consequence of non-marketing within the Community but 
transiting, processing and the like. Our trader in the imaginary case wants however to gain 
for the bikes equal status with Community goods in the internal market and thus he places 
non-Community goods under the release for free circulation procedure and pays customs 
duties. 
 
21
 Official Journal, L. 181, 16/07/1999, 38. 
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No. 2820/98 of 21 December 199822 and anti-dumping duty 30,6% as set out in 
Regulation No. 2474/93.23  
 Chapter 3 and its implementing provisions regulate in detail how the value of 
a certain product is determined for customs purposes. The calculated value most 
often serves as a basis to count the customs that are computed as a percentage 
of this value.  
 The tariff position is a defined place in a list, i.e. tariff, containing the 
percentage of customs duties to be imposed on products. Products are classified 
in this list and the customs authorities have to find the appropriate position for 
each merchandise in question. In practice, the manager of Two Wheels Inc. 
makes a summary declaration when he presents the bikes to customs. 
According to his declaration, the customs authority finds the appropriate tariff 
position.24  
 This is the important stage where detection of falsified stamps could lead to 
investigation. However the sheer volume of transactions and the high number 
of legitimate stamps could make even a weak attempt to falsify a stamp a 
successful one.25 So the Dutch authorities did not discover fraud this time. Should 
they have initiated proceedings, a web of multilateral and bilateral conventions 
with third countries would govern their cooperation with competent authorities 
abroad. Even to find the competent authorities for requesting cooperation is 
difficult due to the diversity of the rules from one convention to another, not to 
mention the problems arising from the application of various procedural and 
substantive norms. Part II of the article tackles some of these problems with a 
restriction to the European context. 
 
Happy end or rather Pyrrhic Victory? 
 
National customs officers run the day-to-day administration, they face first 
fraud sur le terrain and control consignments. They are responsible for trans-
mitting cases to specialized investigating organs too. The national authorities 
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 Official Journal, L 61, 10/03/1999, 55. 
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 Official Journal, L 320, 28/11/1998, 60. 
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 The volume and complexity of rules on the value of goods often lead to errors. Only 
the Common Customs Tariff contains over 4000 product codes for agricultural products 
alone, a further 932 product codes exist for processed goods, and 1416 standard recipes 
and 14000 non-standard recipes. (House of Lords 5th Report 1989. 12.) Officials at the 
local customs stations learn for years the rules and still turn repeatedly to central offices 
specialized in giving advise in certain cases. Sometimes the characteristics of the goods are 
such that expert aid in a laboratory is needed for determining the nature of the product. 
 
25
 See Sieber: op. cit. 10.  
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are obliged to take all the measures necessary to protect the Community budget 
equally as they take all necessary measures to counter fraud affecting the 
national budget. A further obligation is to inform the European Commission of 
national inspection activities and their results26. Moreover, Member States 
prepare an annual inspection report in the light of Article 17(3) of the above 
regulation. These reports make it possible at the European level that the 
authorities can carry out systematic analysis of the data provided.  
 To finish this hypothetical case with an optimistic note, I refer to a 
legislative instrument. On the information flowing from national authorities 
the Commission took appropriate counter measures against companies like 
Defected Wheel Bicycle Industry Corporation by legislating a new regulation. 
It proposed shortly after the introduction of anti-dumping duties on Chinese 
bicycles a new regulation27 that imposes anti-dumping duties on bicycles 
originating from Thailand. The regulation came into force on 13 April 1996 
and terminated fraudulent businesses like the Defected Wheel Bicycle Industry 
Corporation was pursuing. The prevention of a certain type of fraudulent 
activities does not necessarily guarantee that similar pattern do not reoccur in 
new disguise. 
 
  
Part II.  
 
Challenges posed by the phenomenon of EC Fraud  
 
EC fraud necessitates legislative reform on substantive and procedural measures 
on the European level as well as on detection and follow up investigation 
leading to prosecution and sanctioning of perpetrators of cross-border financial 
crime. The aim of this part of the article is not to give a full account of 
problems related to EC fraud-fight, rather to indicate in an easy-to-grasp-
framework selected shortcomings that must necessarily be eliminated should 
the fight against fraud be stepped up in the Community. 
 The completion of the single market and the removal of frontiers eased in 
many aspects the functioning of organized criminal networks in Europe. Trans-
national EC fraud cases such as the case of Defected Wheel Bicycle Industry 
Corporation reveal this phenomenon and represent a particular challenge to 
effective anti-fraud action. The Commission proposed in its opinion “Adapting 
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 A rticle 6(5) of Regulation No. 1150/2000 requests Member States to report fraud 
cases where the amount involved is higher than 10000 euro.  
 
27
 No. 0648, 12 April 1996 OJ L91. 
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the institutions to make a success of enlargement”28 that a legal basis be created 
for the powers and duties of a European Public Prosecutor responsible for 
detecting fraud offences throughout the EU. 
 The first and most obvious effect of trans-national EC fraud is on the number 
of proceedings. In our hypothetical case the customs authorities may initiate five 
different procedures, which are competing and partial in comparison with a 
single procedure run by the European Public Prosecutor in a single European 
Judicial Area. Equally damaging is if only one or two consignments are caught 
in the hypothetical case and the others can operate freely and harm the budget 
of the European Communities. Later stages of the process may bring even more 
unacceptable results. This is due to the various substantive and procedural 
norms in the national systems. The worst example is impunity.29 The divergent 
national rules on the validity of evidence could for example easily prove in 
the court phase that long years of investigations were simply wasted.30 
Perpetrators—with the aid of expert lawyers—could draw up plans how to 
exploit the shortcomings of the system of criminal law protection against EC 
fraud long before the criminal activity takes place.31 Various causes result 
in severe delays in the proceedings. A famous example is the testimony of 
a prosecutor from a Member State before the European Parliament.32 He 
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 COM (2000) 34 of 26 January 2000 http://europa.eu.int/omm/igc2000/offdoc/ 
opin_igc_en.pdf  
 
29
 See the shortcomings of the traditional methods of judicial cooperation between 
Member States. Green Paper. p.13. 
 
30
 Professor Spencer explains in his paper delivered in the Conference on the European 
Public Prosecutor, Trier, 24–25 June 2002, the problems flowing from the diversity of 
national rules on evidence. Here two illustrations of these issues are provided that could be 
applicable in the “bike”-case. Scenario No 1. The British customs authority took the case 
to court after fraud was detected in Hull. The Prosecution wanted to use evidence gathered 
in France by letters rogatory issued by an examining judge but the Court in the UK 
considered it as hearsay and hence inadmissible. Spencer, J. R.: Diversity of national rules 
on evidence—is the mutual admissibility of evidence feasible? 2–3. Scenario No 2. The 
case is brought before a Belgian court. Evidence obtained abroad legally but not in 
accordance with Belgian laws would lead to exclusion of the evidence. Belgian law has a 
strict approach to illegally obtained evidence, while in Sweden it would be admissible 
almost irrespective of how it was obtained. England and Germany represent again another 
group regarding acceptance of illegally, improperly or irregularly obtained evidence 
because in certain cases it is admissible and in other cases not. ibid. 1–2. 
 
31
 Recognized aim of the Community is that “criminals must find no ways of exploiting 
differences in the judicial systems of Member States”. Conseil européen de Tampere: 
Conclusions de la Présidence. Point 5. 
 
32
 Green Paper. 79. 
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declared that he had to deal with more than 50 successive actions in a single 
case brought before him to slow down proceedings and benefit from the time 
needed by the judge to dismiss them. Consequently, by the passage of time the 
execution of the international letters rogatory would generally be of no real 
use, not to mention that delays would help the suspects to disappear. Besides 
efforts to obstruct the process, traditional international cooperation inherently 
results in delays. Two examples are provided. On the one hand, Article 125 of 
the Royal Decree of December 28, 1950 states that no documents (or copies 
thereof) pertaining to criminal investigations or similar matters may be issued 
or supplied to others without specific authorization of the procurator-general 
of the Court of Appeal or the auditor-general. Hence Belgian police is not 
authorized to transmit independently information from criminal records or 
current investigations to colleagues in other Member States.33 On the other hand, 
if a judge handles an inquiry in one Member State but administrative authorities 
deal with the same offence in another Member State, direct contact would 
generally be impossible between them.34 The traditional judicial cooperative 
mechanisms have a defect concerning efficiency and timely work. Further-
more, specific problems such as the secrecy of tax and business information 
are so acute that they may lead to the refusal of mutual assistance.35  
 The Van Dyck scheme described in the first part of this article resulted in 
no judicial action against the perpetrators. Let me change here a bit the 
hypothetical case and examine in the European context what would have most 
likely happened if, say the Belgian, authorities discover a valuable source of 
information indicating fraud. Customs officers in Oostende—after a tip—learn 
that the bike import is accompanied by falsified documents to avoid customs 
duty. After examination of the accounts of Three Wheels Minus One Inc., a 
Belgian company, the authorities suspect a massive and long standing practice 
of deliberative breach of EC norms. The case is referred to the Belgian juge 
d’instruction. He initiates criminal investigations by police to interrogate 
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33
 Vermeulen, G.: A Judicial Counterpart for Europol: Should the European Union 
Establish a Network of Prosecuting and Investigating Officials? 2 UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs, Fall/Winter 1997–1998. 225. 
 
34
 “Contribution complémentaire de la Commission à la conférence intergouverne-
mentale sur les réformes institutionelles — La protection pénale des intérêts financiers 
communautaires : un procureur européen”. 29. 9. 2000, COM (2000), 608. 5. 
 
35
 The Final report on the first exercise devoted to judicial assistance in criminal 
matters, approved by the Council on 28.5.2001., states: “The evaluations showed that the 
issue of tax offences remained such a sensitive one that mutual assistance could, on this 
basis be limited and slowed down or at worst be refused.”. Tax offences (Heading III.e) 
Official Journal, C216, 1. 8. 2001. 
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employers of the Three Wheels Minus One Inc. Investigation in Belgium leads 
to a criminal network, notably with the involvement of a British company, 
Four Wheels Minus Two Inc. and a Portugal one, Five Wheels Minus Three 
Inc. A German company whose name is up to your imagination, dear Reader, 
is also suspected to be part of the criminal network.  
 As evidence is transferred to the United Kingdom the British authorities 
note that the written statements of a Belgian citizen will not be admissible 
before a court of law because evidence was gathered in Belgium under 
commission rogatoire and lacking certain preconditions a court in the UK 
would consider this as hearsay and hence inadmissible.36 The manager of the 
German company disappears together with the funds of the company before 
the authorities could take action, thus enforcement will be impossible in case 
of the German company. In Portugal the prosecutor realizes after having 
received the files that criminal investigation police gathered evidence and not a 
prosecution service or examining judge. Consequently, the evidence was not 
collected in response to the international letters rogatory in compliance with 
Portuguese law, and it will not be admissible in Portugal either.  
 Moreover, supposing that the authorities detect a deliberate attempt to 
breach Community law in all five Member States, official action would be 
governed by five different systems of substantive and procedural laws. In fact, 
as the number of Member States involved in the case increases, the problems 
of national police and judicial authorities grow.37 Particularly difficult would 
be to run the current mechanisms in an enlarged Union. In our imaginary case 
only five countries are involved. If the connection between the five consignments 
were at all discovered, cooperation between the authorities of five nations 
would already be severely hampered by the territoriality principle of national 
criminal laws. The traditional cooperative methods do not suit anymore in an 
ever more integrated Europe as the national authorities are empowered to act 
on their own territory. From the conflicts of jurisdiction and the forum regit 
actum principle to the cumbersome mutual judicial cooperation the fragmented 
European law enforcement area signifies such residual problems that are 
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36
 Professor Spencer clarifies that English law was changed in 1988 to enable foreign 
witnesses to give evidence at fraud trials from abroad by means of a live video link. As the 
foreign witness abroad can not be forced to cooperate, this solution is based on the good 
intention of the foreign witness. Spencer, J. R.: Diversity of national rules on evidence—is 
the mutual admissibility of evidence feasible? Conference on the European Public 
Prosecutor, Trier, 24–25 June 2002. 2–3. 
 
37
 Currently there are seventeen different legal regimes in the EU due to the distinct 
legal systems in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Green Paper. Footnote 
24. 12.  
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leftovers while European integration deepened in other areas. Those are the 
perpetrators who could move without restriction in the Community territory 
and not those responsible for the suppression of crime.38  
 Even such a brief and selective overview within the limits of this article 
indicates that the creation of a European Judicial Area is indispensable. To this 
aim, common European rules are necessary that change both substantively and 
procedurally the current mechanisms of fraud fight. The enforcement of such 
rules would be the responsibility of the European Public Prosecutor.  
 
 
Part III. 
 
The European public prosecutor: Response to the challenges posed by the 
phenomenon of EC Fraud39 
 
As indicated above, severe shortcomings restrict the work of law enforcement 
bodies in Europe in the field of fraud fight. An Italian prosecutor quoting 
tragic statistical data on international cooperation burst out: “International 
cooperation in judicial matters does not work”.40 The necessity of finding a 
legislative response on the European level motored the European Parliament 
and the European Commission to sponsor a comprehensive study on the 
criminal law protection of the financial interests of the Communities. Essential 
part of this project was to elaborate rules on the elimination of the dispersion 
of the prosecution function against cross-border organized networks harming 
the budget of the European Communities.  
 After a decade-long preparation41 the Commission submitted its proposal to 
the Nice IGC with the recommendation on the creation of a European Public 
Prosecutor.42 His responsibility would be detecting, prosecuting and bringing 
to judgment perpetrators of offences detrimental to the financial interests of the 
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38
 Delmas-Marty, M.: Combating Fraud—Necessity, Legitimacy and Feasibility of the 
Corpus Juris. Common Market Law Review 37: 247–256, 2000. 248. 
 
39
 See for detailed analyses conference papers of the Conference on the European 
Public Prosecutor, Trier, 24–25 June 2002., Part II of The Implementation of the Corpus 
Juris in the Member States, eds. Delmas-Marty, M. and Vervaele, J. A. E. Intersentia. 
Utrecht. 2000. Vol. 1. 305–327. and Proceedings of the conference organized by Robert 
Schuman University of Strasburg on the European Public Prosecutor. 19–20 October 2000. 
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Community as well as exercising the prosecution function in the national 
courts of Member States. 
 Its organizational status would be set out in a new Treaty article, 280a. The 
first paragraph of this new article states that the Council appoints the EPP acting 
by a qualified majority. The Commission with the assent of the Parliament 
proposes a list of candidates to the Council. Its term of office is six years and 
its appointment is non-renewable.43 Concerning the removal mechanism, the 
European Court of Justice may, on application by the European parliament, 
the Council or the Commission, remove the EPP. The Treaty provides on the 
reasons of removal: serious misconduct or not meeting the requirements for the 
performance of his duties.44 
 His independence must be beyond doubt. Secondary legislation would 
determine organizational issues such as the structure of the office or its location 
on the basis of Article 251 of the Treaty.45 Similar treaty basis is provided for 
the adoption of (1) rules defining the facts constituting criminal offences relating 
to fraud and any other illegal activity prejudicial to the financial interests of the 
Community, (2) rules of procedure applicable to the activities of the EPP and 
rules governing the admissibility of evidence, and (3) rules applicable to the 
judicial review of procedural measures taken by the EPP in the exercise of his 
functions.46  
 The basic duty of the EPP would be to exercise the prosecution function 
across the Community territory in relation to a precisely circumscribed set of 
offences. A harmonized body of criminal law on the European level would 
reduce the problems indicated in the first parts of this article, including the 
clearing up of conflicts of jurisdiction, conflicts of the application of national 
substantive laws and the complexities of international judicial cooperation. 
Furthermore, the European Public Prosecutor would be able to combine 
information from national sources. Thus a more coordinated and centralized 
administration of information would offer a broader picture for the EPP than 
for isolated national prosecution services. On the basis of the so gained 
information the EPP would be able to direct investigations in the European 
Judicial Area. European Arrest Warrants recognized throughout the Community 
territory would aid his work in a single European investigation area concerning 
fraud fight. It is hoped that the introduction of the institution of the European 
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Public Prosecutor will significantly increase the efficiency of law enforcement 
against perpetrators of EC fraud. 
 The reference above to the Draft Treaty, submitted to Council in 1976, to 
amend the Treaties establishing the European Communities so as to permit the 
adoption of common rules on the protection under criminal law of the financial 
interests of the Communities and the prosecution of infringements of the pro-
visions of the named Treaties, signaled the long-standing cumbersome tension 
on the allocation of criminal powers between the Community and the Member 
States. The lack of political will would damage any effort to constitutionalize 
the EPP. The highly problematic ratification process of third pillar conventions 
in the area of protection of the financial interests of the Community shows 
already bad signs. 
 The failure of the Nice IGC did not let the adopted Treaty be nice for the 
ones that expected a breakthrough in regard to fraud fight. The proposal of the 
Commission on the establishment of the office of the EPP was turned down. 
The questions arise naturally how long we can wait for the European Public 
Prosecutor and how many funds must de defrauded until the fight against fraud 
is stepped up. Or, keeping in mind the failure of the Draft Treaty of 197647, 
will the question be after Samuel Beckett: Waiting for the European Public 
Prosecutor?  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the course of European integration anti-fraud activities gradually became a 
primary issue on the political agenda. The Maastricht Treaty incorporated the 
assimilation principle into the EC Treaty while the Amsterdam Treaty created 
a first pillar legal base for anti-fraud action and extended the co-decision 
procedure to the prevention of and fight against fraud.  
 Pursuant to Article 280 the European Parliament acquired legislative 
authority in the field of anti-fraud policy on an equal footing with the Council. 
In the Council the voting procedure changed from unanimity to qualified 
majority. The Commission gained new capacities and strengthened its autonomy 
vis-à-vis the member states. The recent shift to a horizontal anti-fraud policy 
articulated in the adoption of cross-sectoral legislative instruments.  
 The europeanization of anti-fraud policy is a clear tendency from a historical 
point of view. The decisive step to transfer penal power to the European 
level is still not made though. The European Public Prosecutor to enforce the 
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harmonized rules of the Corpus Juris became indispensable in an ever more 
integrated Europe. Without a harmonized legal framework for the Single 
European Judicial Area the puzzle still misses its basic pieces. At the next 
crossroads concerning the power balance between the Community institutions 
and the Member States will be the prospective incorporation of certain parts, 
particularly the European prosecuting authority, of the Corpus Juris into the 
treaties. The next IGC in deciding what features the European Judicial Area 
takes will have to concentrate on transparency and legitimacy of, and politico-
legal responsibility for anti-fraud measures. Only this way can the values of 
European integration be protected together with the financial interests of the 
European Communities.  
 
 
 
